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Johan van der Walt 
Introduction 
 
Deconstruction is a mode of philosophical thinking with which the French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida broke away from the traditional and dominant 
ways in which texts have been read and understood in the history or Western 
civilisation. Instead of focusing on the “ideal content” of meaning that texts 
evidently aimed to convey, and instead of engaging with in a debate with the 
author regarding this “ideal content” of the text, Derrida focused on the way in 
which the “material” organisation of texts complicates, relatives, destabilises 
and even renders contradictory their ideal content or meaning.  
 
What was Derrida’s aim with this new approach to reading and understanding 
texts? The brief description of Derridean deconstruction and its reception in 
legal theory that follows responds to this question in three steps. Section I 
briefly explains a number of the key concepts that Derrida developed in his 
early work. Section II looks at the way in which these themes or concepts 
found their way into legal theory. Section III then offers an assessment of the 
reception of deconstruction in legal theory that pays specific attention to the 
way in which the aim or purpose of deconstruction was understood by some 
of the scholars who played a prominent role in the reception. Section IV 
concludes the piece with an alternative assessment of the relation between 
deconstruction and legal theory. 
 
I. KEY THEMES OF DERRIDEAN DECONSTRUCTION 
 
When Derridean deconstruction burst onto the scene of 20th century 
philosophical thought, a number of key themes captured the imaginations of 
those who joined the “deconstruction movement.” These key themes pivoted 
on, among others, the notions of “différance”, “trace” and “supplement” that 
Derrida developed in his early work. All these themes inspired the members 
or followers of the movement to also acclaim Derrida’s provocative assertion 
that “there is nothing outside the text” – il n’y a pas de hors-texte (Derrida 
1967: 227; 1974: 158). Let us begin to take a closer look at deconstruction 
and the broad theoretical movement that it precipitated by unpacking these 
notions of “différance”, “trace” and “supplement” together with the contention 
“there is nothing outside the text.” 
 
Différance denoted for Derrida two fundamental features of language. The 
first concerned the way in which all linguistic signs derived their ability to 
signify “something” (we will take a closer look at this “something” presently) 
from their difference with other signs. The second concerned the way the 
sign’s ability to signify also derived from their deferral of the signs from which 
they differed. The signifying sign – the sign that signifies at a particular 
moment in time – signifies something because of the way it precludes other 
signs from signifying something else at the very same time. In other words, 
signification is the result of the sign’s momentary ability to suspend and 
postpone until later any signification of other signs that signify “something” 
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else and can indeed be anticipated to do so again later. To give a simple 
example: The letters c, a and t, when spelled in this sequence signifies a 
particular kind of animal because of the way the signification “c-a-t” differs 
from other significations such as “d-o-g” or “c-o-w” that may later come to 
signify the different animals that they are usually taken to signify when they 
effectively signify something. The same can be said of the individual 
alphabetic letters themselves and their phonetic or sonic equivalents. We 
receive and register the signification “a” because we do not receive at the very 
same time the signification “b” or “c,” and so forth until z; we receive the 
signification “b” because we do not receive “a” or “c,” and so forth until “z” 
(see Derrida 1972: 1-29; 1982: 1-28) 
 
This simple explication of différance already allows one an elementary grasp 
on the other two key operative terms in the early work of Derrida brought into 
consideration above, namely, “trace” and “supplement.” The explication of 
différance already shows how potential significations that are currently absent 
leave a trace on actual significations, notwithstanding their “absence.” “C-a-t” 
comes to the fore as an effective signification because of the way in which the 
absence of the “deferred” significations “d-o-g” or “c-o-w” is constitutive of this 
signification. “C-a-t” thus carries with it a trace or traces of “d-o-g” and “c-o-w.” 
The deferral of “d-o-g” or “c-o-w” (that takes place whenever we are not 
talking about dogs or cats) by the actual signification “c-a-t” does not make “d-
o-g” or “c-o-w” disappear without a trace. “C-a-t” is, for that matter, also the 
veritable “trace” of “d-o-g” and/or “c-o-w.” A sign always figures as a trace of 
other signs not currently or immediately “present.” Part of our understanding 
of what a dog or a cat is, depends on understanding why we do not take dogs 
and cows as different species of cats, but as completely different species of 
animals. The same would of course be true if “d-o-g” or “c-o-w” were to 
become the currently or presently effective signifier (when, for instance, the 
conversation switches from cats to dogs or cows). They too would then carry 
or effectively become the traces of “c-a-t,” etc. The upshot of all this is that 
effective signification is as such always the effect of interlaced traces; traces 
that are themselves the effects of other traces, and never of something 
beyond or outside the trace. At no point in time does linguistic signification 
attain to some kind of unitary substance or presence. It never constitutes a 
substantive unit of meaning. Language is an interlacing play of traces of 
traces (see Derrida 1972: 25;1982: 24). 
 
Derrida discovered the play of interlacing traces also to be at work in all acts 
of textual supplementation. The need to supplement a text with an appendix 
or addendum suggests an author’s sense that the true or accurate meaning of 
the main text only comes to the fore once the appendix or supplement is 
added. At the same time, however, the supplementation on its own only 
attains meaning as a supplement, that is, not on its own, but always in 
connection with a main text. In this way, the main text ends up being the 
supplement of the supplement. There is therefore no such thing as the main 
text in the end. The meaning of any text is affected and effected by its 
margins, to bring into play here another key term that Derrida would develop 
in his early work. The meaning or significance of any text is ultimately 
fundamentally conditioned by that which is either deliberately written into its 
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margins as a supplement (or a footnote), or that which is silently relegated to 
the margins for purposes of centring the main purport of the text. In the final 
analysis, no text is closed or enclosed. Textual meaning is never neatly 
enclosed within the boundaries of a text that can for this reason be presented 
like a finished book. On the contrary, Derridean deconstruction invites readers 
to also look at “finished books” as inscribed in an endless textuality or 
intertextuality that exposes all claims to semiotic and semantic closure – all 
pretensions that one is saying or signifying this and nothing else – to margins 
that compel one to re-include what one pretends to exclude (see Derrida 
1967: 203-234; 1974: 141-164). 
 
This more or less “standard” understanding of key themes from Derrida’s 
early works gave rise to a new wave of literary studies that challenged well 
established interpretations of literary texts by exposing these interpretations to 
elements of the text that have hitherto always been ignored or considered less 
important. This new wave of literary studies soon also spread to other fields of 
textual studies, and legal theory was no exception. Critical legal theorists 
began to employ the deconstructive reading strategies of literary theorists to 
dig up marginalised, ignored or suppressed elements of important legal texts 
in order to challenge the dominant interpretations of these texts and to open 
the way for alternative readings that might bring about legal reform, as we 
shall see presently. However, before we turn to this reception of 
deconstruction in legal theory, let us bring into play one more aspect of the 
deconstructive theory or thinking that Derrida put forward in his early work, 
namely, his claim that “there is nothing outside the text” – “il n’y a pas de hors-
texte.”  
 
The key insight that Derrida sought to communicate with his claim “there is 
nothing outside the text” was a further implication of the way in which 
combinations of difference and deferral – the two key elements of différance -  
constructed – and deconstructed – meaning. The notion of différance 
effectively put paid to the idea that a linguistic sign actually referred to 
something beyond language, that is, beyond the differing and deferring 
interplay of linguistic signs. The Saussurean linguistic perspective that 
informed Derrida’s understanding of différance broke away from all “realistic” 
conceptions of the relation between a signs or signifiers, on the one hand, and 
that which they signified, on the other. From the perspective of the structural 
linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, the sign or signifier never relates to 
something beyond language. Whatever a particular signifier may come to 
signify, is an effect of the relation of signifiers with other signifiers. 
Signification, and all communication of meaning that may result from it, 
accordingly remains a contingent intra-textual and inter-textual process. There 
is for this reason ultimately nothing – no instance of stable meaning and no 
stable referential relation between a sign and some signified “semantic 
content” – that exists outside and independently from the contingent interplay 
of signifiers and the compilations and combinations of such signifiers that 
ultimately come to constitute a text. Outside the text there is just more text. 
The one text supplements and displaces another in an endless play of 
textuality. 
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What, then, is the point of it all? What was Derrida’s point when he pointed 
out all of this? Was his point simply that there no longer is a point, or, that 
there never was a point as one may understand Friedrich Nietzsche already 
to have argued a hundred years earlier? Was his point that one should simply 
stop considering oneself burdened with this question so that one can begin to 
take part freely in the exhilarating charges and discharges – or disseminations 
– of an ultimately inexhaustible textuality?  Let us engage with this question 
by taking a closer look now at the reception of deconstruction in legal theory. 
 
II. THE RECEPTION OF DECONSTRUCTION IN LEGAL THEORY 
 
The problem with many strands of deconstruction in legal theory, wrote 
Christopher Norris in 1988, concerns the way it reduces deconstructive 
techniques of reading to a too a general method that can be applied more or 
less any text for purposes of pursuing an already envisaged result or outcome 
(Norris 1988, 179). At the time of Norris’ observation, James Balkin’s seminal 
article “Deconstructive Practice and legal theory” (Balkin, 1987) could be 
considered exemplary in this regard. “Deconstruction” argued Balkin, “by its 
very nature is an analytical tool.” (Ibid, 786). Balkin’s article surely made its 
mark in legal theory, “mainstream legal theory” included. It even convinced 
Neil MacCormick that deconstruction was a useful “heuristic device.” 
(MacCormick 1990, 554). The risk of reducing Derrida’s reading techniques to 
a method, tool or “device” was perhaps always on the cards, but the 
materialisation of the risk could only take place at the cost of ignoring 
Derrida’s caveat that deconstructive reading consists in a certain exposure of 
the reader to a text in a way that deprives him or her of the subjective control 
of that text. As Derrida put it, deconstruction consists in “the general 
movement of the field and it is never exhausted by the conscious calculation 
of a [reading] subject.” (Derrida 1981, 82). 
 
For Derrida, deconstruction involves the reader in a movement or event of 
reading to which he or she is exposed. It is not a method that the reading 
subject controlled for purposes of arriving at anticipated or desired outcomes. 
At the time of deconstruction’s early reception in legal theory, Pierre Schlag 
was the one legal theorist who understood this aspect of Derrida’s thought 
well. He pointed out how Balkin’s understanding of deconstruction reserved 
for the reading self or subject a place outside the process of reading and 
outside the text for that matter. For Balkin, claimed Schlag, the outside of the 
text is still “me” - “le hors de texte, c’est moi” (Schlag 1990). Balkin surely did 
not shy away from this location of the reading subject outside the process of 
deconstructive reading. He unflinchingly affirmed the fact that the 
deconstructivist legal theorist has a premeditated politics. He or she has “an 
ax to grind”; she is “picking her targets” (Balkin, 1990, 1627-1629). 
 
What Schlag pointed out well and what Balkin was happy to confirm was the 
fact that the reception of Derridean deconstruction in legal theory in the 1980s 
and 1990s went hand in hand with a conception of it as a tool that could be 
used by progressive or left wing legal theorists to pursue predetermined 
political goals. No one seemed to be bothered at the time by the possibility 
that, once reduced to a tool or method, deconstruction could also come to be 
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used for conservative or reactionary political goals. This possibility need not 
detain one’s attention for long, for it did not materialise. Conservative and 
reactionary legal theorists most likely simply sensed that “deconstruction” was 
something that happened to belong to left wing or liberal legal theoretical 
circles and therefore stayed away from it. Besides, established paradigms of 
legal formalism and originalism surely served them well enough. They were 
certainly not out looking for new theoretical approaches. 
 
Two considerations nevertheless make it necessary to take a closer look at 
the “leftness” or “progressiveness” of deconstructive legal theory. The first is 
the one just mentioned above: If deconstruction were simply a tool that could 
be utilised to upset or undermine dominant readings of text, that tool could be 
used by anyone, political conservatives and right wingers included. Secondly, 
Derridean deconstruction surely did not invent or inaugurate left wing politics, 
and is surely also not a prerequisite for such politics. Progressive politicians 
and lawyers have been fighting great battles and winning a good number of 
them (almost invariably relying on notions of “justice” and “fairness” that avid 
deconstructivists consider highly deconstructible) before Jacques Derrida 
started capturing the imagination of a new generation of largely left, liberal or 
progressive legal theorists. And, in as much as these progressive lawyers 
also lost many battles, deconstructive legal theory could hardly be expected 
or seen to offer the promise of fewer failures and more successes in future. 
On the contrary, faced with the question of deconstruction, progressive 
politicians and lawyers – to the extent that they are effective and efficient 
politicians and lawyers – are most likely to sense that deconstruction brings 
something unique to the scene of political deliberation that is likely to slow 
down one’s progressive politics, instead of advancing or accelerating it. And 
this something unique would increasingly, Derrida’s later work would 
increasingly reveal, was exactly the “outside of the text” that his early work 
claimed not to exist. Let us take a look now at this return of the outside of the 
text in Derrida’s later work. 
 
III. THE OUTSIDE OF THE TEXT 
 
Were progressive politicians and lawyers indeed to put forward the misgivings 
regarding deconstruction as a political tool or strategy to which we have 
alluded above, they may well be quite right. The more the so-called “ethical” 
turn in Derrida’s work became manifest during the 1990s, the more it became 
evident that deconstruction is not a tool that could be employed, but much 
rather a unique endeavour to precipitate the disruption of any such calculated 
and calculable employment of tools. It would become the recurring theme of 
Derrida’s late work that key ethical and political concepts of Western 
civilisation such as justice, hospitality, forgiveness and friendship should 
ultimately not be considered political goals that can be achieved through the 
effective launching of methods and programmes. They are, on the contrary, 
denotations of encounters with an otherness or strangeness that arrives 
uninvited at our doorstep, so to speak. These encounters demand a 
response, but they evidently preclude any calculation of the response 
demanded, any rational determination of what should be done, any resort to 
available methods of operation, any recourse to existing political or moral 
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norms and codes. These encounters, are in fact, encounters with the “outside 
of the text.”  
 
However much Derrida may have stressed in his early work that there is “no 
outside of the text”, he evidently became nothing less than obsessed with this 
“nothing” outside the text as the “ethical” and “political” turn in his work took 
shape. We shall presently take a closer look at the status or characteristics of 
this “ethical” and “political” turn. Let us first just note that Derrida did not 
consider this turn to introduce a new element into his work that was not there 
in the beginning. He always remained adamant that the concern with 
“différance” in his early work was already a contemplation of the arrival of 
otherness and strangeness that he would later come to articulate with 
recourse to notions of the event, justice, hospitality, forgiveness and 
friendship (see Derrida 1993b). If his claims in this regard are to be taken 
seriously, it would evidently mean that deconstruction never was the 
interpretivist celebration of the infinite possibilities of intra- and inter-textual 
meaning that it was widely understood to be in the early years of its reception. 
It was an endeavour to precipitate an encounter – and to solicit an experience 
– with an uninterpretable outside of texts that ultimately disrupts all 
interpretive claims. A very early description of the “method” of deconstruction 
indeed suggests exactly this. The inversion of semantic hierarchies that 
deconstruction seeks to solicit, wrote Derrida in 1972, is less concerned with 
the end result of this inversion than it is with the interval of otherness that 
becomes evident in the process of inversion, an interval of otherness that 
exceeds the textual or binary terms of both the initial and the inversed 
hierarchy (see Derrida 1982: 42). This description of deconstruction can 
plausibly be considered a clear indication that Derrida was always decidedly 
less interested in the new textual possibilities that may actually result from 
deconstructive practices, than he was in the disruption of textuality that 
occurred in the moment of deconstruction. 
  
In other words, Derrida did not value deconstructive disruptions of texts for 
reasons of their beneficial effects. He did not value them because he had no 
doubt that they could not be valued or evaluated. They do not themselves 
have any value that they could offer, for they arrive, from beyond all 
frameworks and dispensations of value and evaluation, as critical moments 
that render these frameworks and dispensations fundamentally questionable. 
In the same text that he pointed out the “interval” that occurs in the inversion 
(the phase of overturning) of binary hierarchies, Derrida (1982:12) also 
observed that there is “no beyond of metaphysics” and no “transgression” (in 
the same vein that he claimed there “is no outside of the text”). This 
awareness of a limitless and inescapable metaphysics again reflected 
Derrida’s insight into an interpretive condition – a condition that marks each 
and every instance of textual or situational interpretation – that allows no 
escape from the grasp of readily available normative evaluations. And yet, the 
concern with demands of justice, hospitality, forgiveness and friendship that 
disrupt all existing frameworks of normative evaluations in his later work 
would suggest that his early awareness of the ubiquitous and endless 
condition of textual or metaphysical or normative interpretation could hardly 
have constituted an act of resignation or surrender in the face of an 
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inescapable field of normative interpretation and evaluation, let alone a 
celebration of this field. As we saw above, this is surely not how Derrida 
understood his early work. Notwithstanding his insight into the ubiquitous 
textuality from which no act of reading or interpretation could escape, his 
concern with différance, trace, supplementation was along a paradoxical or 
aporetic concern with moments that offered fleeting encounters with the limits 
of a seemingly limitless text and limitless metaphysics. 
 
It is important to underline again that Derrida did not consider these aporetic 
encounters with the limits of limitless systems of normative evaluation new 
sources of value or new grounds of evaluation. He had no illusions about their 
potential destructiveness as far as existing values and systems of value are 
concerned. Hospitality to the event, he wrote in Spectres of Marx, entails the 
willingness to risk the materialisation of evil (Derrida 1993: 57, 111-112). The 
relentlessness with which he pursued the possibility of these impossible 
encounters – the possibility of the impossible would become another recurrent 
theme in his late work (see for instance Derrida 2002) – should nevertheless 
caution any legal theoretical engagement with his work to pay due attention to 
the irreducible difference between law (the ultimate instantiation of normative 
evaluation) and justice (the most incisive encounter with the disruption of 
available normativity) that he would emphasize in Force of Law (Derrida 
1990), the text that remains Derrida’s most direct and encompassing 
engagement with law and legal theory. Let us now take a closer look at what a 
due regard for the difference between law and justice might mean for the 
relation between law and deconstruction, considering that Derrida expressly 
equated deconstruction with the justice that the law is not.  
 
 
IV. DECONSTRUCTION AND LEGAL THEORY 
 
Legal theoretical engagements with Derrida’s work have indeed made little 
effort thus far to make sense of the hospitality to the potentially hugely 
destructive eventfulness of existence that Derrida evidently considered the 
heart of his concern with deconstruction. Engagements with the demands of 
justice can easily be understood as normative engagements with the 
amelioration of law. In the case of Derrida, such an understanding of justice 
would be a misunderstanding. For him, justice concerns a disruptive event 
that renders existing law inapplicable. The same applies to any future law that 
may come to replace existing law after disruptive encounters. In other words, 
justice should also not be confused with any improved law – or any 
improvements of law – that may be introduced after forceful experiences with 
the unsuitability and inapplicability of earlier law. Justice concerns, for Derrida, 
the very experience of an irreducible incongruity between the demands of 
justice and all positive instantiations of past, present or future law. The 
experience of justice as an experience of irreducible incongruity is such that 
no law reform can ever hope to overcome or erase it. This should caution one 
against the kind of link between deconstruction and purposeful law reform that 
Balkin and many other early proponents of legal theoretical deconstruction 
seemed to contemplate.   
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The same applies to the relation between deconstruction and revolutionary 
interventions that may bring about far-reaching legal change. Again, one can 
imagine Derrida or any other deconstructive legal theorist to be highly in 
favour of and even elated about some or other instance of far-reaching legal 
change that left-wing or progressive legal theorists may consider a victory. 
Deconstruction surely does not proscribe or preclude solidarity with the left. It 
just should not be equated with it, given its concern with an extreme concern 
with incongruity that hardnosed left-wing politicians may well consider curious 
or quaint, if not downright obstructive and debilitating. Deconstructive legal 
theory will and should of course not consider itself quaint or curious, but it 
may want to pay due attention to its potential to indeed turn out obstructive 
and debilitating, or in any case not very helpful, when it comes to positive 
pursuits of programmatic political goals. For only if it does so, will it attain an 
incisive understanding of its unique relation to such positive pursuits of 
programmatic political goals. 
 
The Derridean or deconstructive concern with the incongruity between law 
and justice – the incongruity that allows for no pragmatic or revolutionary 
closure of the gap between them – is perhaps nowhere more expressly and 
strikingly articulated than in the passage in Force of law where Derrida 
describes the sheer madness of the justice he contemplates (see Derrida 
1994a:56). The conception of justice that he puts forward here would seem to 
suggest, as forcefully as Foucault suggested, that the way from man to the 
true man somehow passes through the mad man” (de l’homme à l’homme 
vrai le chemin passe par l’homme fou - Foucault 1972: 544). Derrida’s 
fascination with an insane suspension of law surely resonates well with 
Foucault’s anti-institutional and anti-juridical concern with freedom. From the 
perspective of any legal theory that stresses the need for juridical, institutional 
and regulatory stabilisations or formalisations of liberty, this anti-institutional 
and anti-juridical concern with a pristine freedom and a pristine justice must 
come across as sheer madness. This is how lawyer and legal theorists can 
invariably be expected to see the matter, left-wing or progressive lawyers and 
theorists included. Alain Supiot’s assessment of Derrida’s as nothing less than 
lunacy (folle en effet) is a case in point (see Supiot 2010: 48). 
 
Neil MacCormick once offered a surprising olive branch to the “deconstruction 
wave” in legal theory by recognising its transformative and innovative 
potential. Had he discerned the extremity of Derrida’s “insane” concern with 
the radical incongruity between justice and the law as clearly as Supiot does, 
he may well have been less convinced of the transformative and innovative 
potential of deconstructive legal theory. But he took his cue from theorists like 
Balkin who had tamed and domesticated deconstruction in order to extract 
from it an innovative and transformative potential. Legal theorists who 
continue to deem it important to engage seriously with Derridean 
deconstruction for purposes of distilling from it constructive insights for the 
normative concerns of legal theory would either have to admit that they are 
still relying on a highly tamed and domesticated understanding of Derrida’s 
work that ignores essential aspects of it, or they would need to break new 
ground to show what the radically disruptive potential of his work might mean 
for legal theory after all. 
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Despite his generous accommodation of the deconstruction movement in 
legal theory, MacCormick retained a clear enough sense of its sheer and 
ultimately rather “unconstructive” disruptiveness to nevertheless impart the 
message that the really important work of jurisprudence and legal theory lies 
elsewhere. From the perspective of the more incisive regard for Derrida’s 
radical concern with the abyssal divide between law and the deconstructive 
experience with justice, one may want to consider “Reconstruction and 
Deconstruction” as a better title than “Reconstruction after Deconstruction” for 
the insights MacCormick sought to communicate. The phrase “Reconstruction 
and Deconstruction” communicates – or can be read to communicate – a 
more incisive regard for the disjunction between the deconstructive concern 
with an impossible justice, on the one hand, and the legal theoretical concern 
with possible law and plausible law reform, on the other. Not only would this 
simple juxtaposition of deconstruction and legal theory resonate better with 
the categorical divide between law and justice (deconstruction) that Derrida 
articulated in Force of Law, it would also recognise better the equally 
legitimate or at least equally inevitable demands that both concerns – the 
concern with good and coherent law and the concern with abyssal encounters 
with the irreducible inadequacy and inapplicability of all law – make on the 
human imagination. 
 
This understanding of the irreparable disjunction between law and legal 
theory, on the one hand, and the deconstructive concern with an abyssal 
experience with justice, on the other, invites one to recognise and take 
seriously the completely opposite trajectories of legal theory and 
deconstruction. Deconstruction seeks to move – doomed to fail, no doubt – 
directly towards the cataclysmic event that catapults it into existence. It seeks 
to return to the event from which it derives. This much is clear from the 
reckless hospitality to the event that Derrida describes in Spectres of Marx, 
already pointed out above. Law and legal theory seek to move – ultimately 
equally doomed to fail – away from the cataclysms (social conflict, revolution, 
crime, delict, etc.) that call them into existence. This decisive retreat from the 
event is most evident in Hans Kelsen’s endeavour to construct a pure theory 
of law, a theory that extracts and distils the law from the historical reality from 
which it emerges (see Van der Walt ). This radically opposite trajectory of 
Kelsen’s pure theory of law may well be – perhaps surprisingly, but deeply 
plausibly – the legal theory that tells one more about deconstruction than any 
legal theory that seeks to integrate deconstruction into legal theory. Kelsen’s 
normative constructivism and Derrida’s non-normative deconstruction may 
well be closer companions than one would think at first.  
 
The human condition appears to be fatefully suspended between – and 
sustained by – both these Kelsenian and Derridean trajectories. It is 
unthinkable that a future humanity might one day desist from normative 
constructions that shield it from the chaos and uncertainties to which its 
irreducible historicity (its existence in the openness of time and history) 
exposes it. But it is also unthinkable that a future humanity might one day be 
fully reconciled with these normative constructions that shield it from the 
vicissitudes of its historical existence. This is so because humanity also 
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invariably experiences and perceives normative constructions – established 
moral, legal and even aesthetic codes – as hardened shells that frustrate life 
as much as they protect it. As long as this deep duality between the need to 
be shielded from and the desire to be exposed to the reality of existence 
continues to condition the human imagination, the impulses that incline legal 
theorists to enthusiasm for Derridean notions of deconstruction are likely to 
continue their tug of war with Kelsenian concerns with adequate normative 
construction. A simple choice in favour of the one or the other side is not an 
option for those jurists and legal theorists with a realistic and holistic regard 
for both these sides of the human psyche. And the idea that a better 
reconciliation between these two sides will become possible one day also 
does not strike them as seriously plausible.  
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